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After the introduction of the freedom of movement for Eastern European workers,
EU-15 countries were expected to reduce public benefits in order to avoid becoming
“welfare magnets”. However, OECD data do not support the prediction of a race to
the bottom in benefit levels. Using EU-LFS data, I analyze the determinants of
migration flows and do not find evidence that welfare state variables affect
migration flows when controlling for temporary political restrictions of the freedom
of movement. This explains why the pressure to modify welfare spending is small.
Furthermore, evidence is found that the restrictions offset the migration incentive
effects of work-related pull factors.
JEL classification: F22, J21, J61
Keywords: Determinants of migration decisions; EU enlargement; “Welfare
migration”; Push and pull factors1 Introduction
In December 2002, the European Council voted in favor of enlarging the EU by an
additional 10 countries. The decision was approved by the EU parliament in April
2003. On the 1st of May 2004, these 10 countries, mainly situated in Eastern
Europe (EU-10)1, joined the Union. On the 1st of January 2007, Bulgaria and
Romania (EU-2) followed. A central institutional change connected to the accept-
ance of the new member states in the European “club” was the introduction of the
freedom of movement for workers. According to this legislation, every citizen in
the EU can start working in another EU country without the need for a work
permit. For potential migrant workers, this regulation significantly reduces the cost
of moving abroad.
Within a common labor market, the size and composition of migration flows are
not determined by the decisions of local immigration officers, but by the aggregate
of individual migration decisions in the source regions. Thus, national governments
partly delegate their sovereignty of determining the size and composition of the
population to millions of potential migrant workers who can freely decide where to
settle. Since the standard of living in the new member states was well below the
average level in the old EU-15 member states2 at the time the legislation was
brought into force, the accession initiated a debate about the sustainability of the
welfare state.2014 Skupnik; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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combination with access to public benefits in the EU-15 would result in an erosion of
protection levels. According to his reasoning, national governments could be expected
to avoid inflows of migrants claiming welfare by reducing the generosity of benefits. A
race to the bottom dynamic in the EU-15 could thus cause an erosive process. Kvist
(2004) drew less drastic conclusions by arguing that the effects of “welfare migration” are
too small to directly affect the decision-making process on the national level. However, he
also considered that governments in the EU-15 might engage in strategic interactions with
respect to decisions on national social policies.
Certainly also as a result of these political controversies, the so-called 2 + 3 + 2 rule
found its way into the accession treaties. This rule concedes EU member states the
right to postpone the realization of the freedom of movement for workers for up to 7
years after the accession. It applies to workers from the EU-83 and the EU-2 member
states. In summary, the option of applying the 2 + 3 + 2 rule led to a very asymmetric
opening of the labor markets in the EU-15 towards the East. Ultimately, national deci-
sion makers in EU-15 countries were endowed with two policy instruments to poten-
tially influence the inflow of workers: the generosity of the welfare state and the
postponement of the labor market opening through the 2 + 3 + 2 rule. The main goal of
this study is to analyze how these political decisions influence the migration flows to
the EU-15. How relevant is the “welfare magnet” effect in the EU-15? How did the
“welfare magnet” effect interact with the application of the 2 + 3 + 2 rule? Did a race to
the bottom in the generosity of welfare states take place?
In a first step, I present the strategic instruments of the national policy makers in a
stylized way. I illustrate the development of the welfare state in the different EU mem-
ber states in the aftermath of the 2002 decision in Copenhagen. Several indicators char-
acterizing welfare state generosity like the ratio of social expenditures to the GDP level,
the social expenditures per capita and the net replacement rate that defines the out-of-
work benefit level are described. In addition, the asymmetric application of the 2 + 3 +
2 rule in the different countries is discussed. Secondly, an analysis of the effects of the
policies in the EU-15 member states on the immigration flows is pursued. Using micro
data from the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), I estimate the effects of a rich set of
determinants that influence the individual migration decision and thus the migrant in-
flow to a destination country in the EU-15.
A special focus is put on the “welfare magnet” effect since the significance and
strength of this effect determines the magnitude of clustering in generous welfare
states. The stronger the effect is the more intense should be the interaction of national
governments in reducing social expenditures. As micro data from the EU-LFS are used,
some light is shed on the effect of the composition of the diaspora and the source
population on the migration flows. Information on socio-economic characteristics of
the surveyed is included in the regressions which allows for a deeper analysis of the
network relationship of the sending and receiving country.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the literature on “wel-
fare migration” and the effects of networks and institutional restrictions on individual mi-
gration decisions. In Section 3, I present some stylized facts about the potential race to the
bottom dynamics in the EU-15 after the enlargement decision of Copenhagen in 2002. The
development of the welfare state generosity and the asymmetric application of the
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of national policy makers. Section 4 presents the data and a descriptive analysis of migra-
tion flows from the EU-10 and EU-2 member states. Section 5 is devoted to the empirical
analysis of the determinants of migration flows using the EU-LFS and to the discussion of
the major findings. Furthermore, I present results from a sensitivity analysis which in-
cludes alternative concepts of welfare state generosity and a comparison of the results
with the previous findings. The last section concludes.
2 Literature review: “Welfare magnets” and the migration decision
The direction, size and composition of international migration flows are functions of
the aggregate of millions of individual migration and remigration decisions. In turn,
these decisions are determined by a rich variety of country- and individual-specific fac-
tors4. Zimmermann (1995) describes these individual choices as best answers to a com-
plex system of push and pull factors. Initially, the discussion of welfare state generosity
as a pull factor goes back to the Roy model (Roy, 1951) that is applied to the case of
migration decisions by Borjas (1994)5. Based on this theoretical model, Borjas (1999)
develops the “welfare magnet” hypothesis. It consists of two parts: (1) states with high
levels of social security attract more migrants in general (better insurance of unemploy-
ment risks as a pull factor) and (2) immigrant flows to these states are characterized by
an over-proportionately high share of low-skilled migrants (negative selection). The
first part addresses the issue of selection across alternative destinations while the sec-
ond addresses the selection within the immigration flows.
Borjas (1999) tests whether the hypothesis is supported by data on the patterns of im-
migration to US states. He finds empirical evidence that, relative to natives, benefit re-
ceiving immigrants to the US cluster in states where benefit levels are high. The native-
immigrant gap is explained by the differences in migration costs.
However, several economists have challenged these findings. Kaushal (2005) does not
find evidence that immigrants cluster in US states that are characterized by a high level
of benefits. She shows that access to TANF, Medicaid and food stamps (means-tested
programs) does not or only weakly change the location choice of low-skilled unmarried
immigrant women. Since this is the group that is most likely to be dependent on wel-
fare systems, she concludes that the “welfare magnet” hypothesis can be rejected. Other
authors argue that clustering of migrants is more likely caused by migrant network ef-
fects than by the welfare levels. Beine et al. (2011) use data of bilateral migration flows
from 195 source to 30 OECD destination countries and find that the size of diasporas
in destination countries have a positive effect on immigrant inflows and an adverse ef-
fect on the education level of the immigrants. In contrast, the benefit level does not ap-
pear to have a significant effect on the location choice across the countries.
Pedersen et al. (2008) analyze flows from 126 countries to 26 OECD destination countries.
Their results are in line with the findings of Beine et al. (2011). While Beine et al. (2011)
have information on the education level of the surveyed and thus are able to directly test
the effect of the welfare level on the skill composition of the flows, Pedersen et al. (2008)
proxy the skill level by the GDP of the source country. The latter study finds weak evidence
for a U-shaped relationship between the welfare level in the destination and the GDP per
capita in the source. Migrants of relatively poor or of relatively rich countries in terms of
GDP per capita are most attracted to destination countries with high benefit levels.
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selection of migrants.
Empirical studies with a cross-country focus on Europe are relatively scarce. De Giorgi
and Pellizzari (2009) analyze panel data from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) and find a significant effect of the net replacement income in the destination coun-
try on migration decisions. However, the effect is small compared to the incentive from a
higher annual compensation of employees. In their study, a higher compensation has a 10
times larger effect on the likelihood of migrating to a destination than an increase in the net
replacement income. Brücker et al. (2002) find support for the thesis that welfare gen-
erosity implies negative sorting of migrants in Europe. The study shows that high-
skilled migrants prefer countries with low benefits and taxes, while the low-skilled
cluster in countries with a high benefit level. Giulietti et al. (2013) focus on the correl-
ation between unemployment benefit spending and immigration flows from EU and
non-EU countries to 19 European countries. They only find a small correlation be-
tween benefit levels and immigration flows for non-EU migrants using OLS while the
analysis with IV and GMM estimators gives evidence for a much smaller effect close to
zero.
In a recent paper, Razin and Wahba (2011) provide an explanation why most empir-
ical studies do not find evidence for the “welfare magnet” hypothesis. Introducing dif-
ferent migration regimes, they show why “welfare migration” should only prevail in
common labor markets without mobility restrictions. It is argued that, for example, in
the common EU labor market with free movement for workers the benefit level should
act as a pull factor, while this need not be the case for countries with a migration re-
gime that restricts the entry or the access to welfare for migrants.
To summarize the current state of research, two determinants besides the differences
in the skill rewards should be named that “compete” for being the more important ex-
planatory variables for migrant clustering: the network effect and the “welfare magnet”.
While some studies emphasize the clustering effect through networks (Beine et al.,
2011; Kaushal, 2005; Pedersen et al., 2008), other authors point out the importance of
the welfare level (Borjas, 1999; Brücker et al., 2002; De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009).
However, these studies only partially control for the differential effect of migration re-
gimes that might reduce or completely eliminate the marginal effects of the push and
pull factors. A further weakness of most studies is the use of bilateral macro flow data
that do not allow for the analysis of the composition of the diaspora and the population
in the source region. Migrant stocks are treated as black boxes so that incentives due
to socio-economic characteristics are to be ignored in the analysis.
3 Strategic interaction: Is there evidence for a race to the bottom?
According to the non-discrimination principle in the European treaties, every EU citi-
zen can claim benefits in another EU member state after a short period of employment.
Authors like Sinn (2002) and Kvist (2004) have thus warned that the EU enlargements
in 2004 and 2007 might lead to a race to the bottom in welfare state protection. In a
common EU labor market, a reform of national welfare institutions does not only affect
the economic outcomes via the local labor market but may also affect the migration in-
centives for potential workers from other EU countries as the attractiveness of a destin-
ation country changes ceteris paribus.
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potential “welfare migration” by introducing restrictions on labor mobility. In the case
of the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, these restrictions are defined under the 2 +
3 + 2 rule. The relevance of the pull effect of the welfare state generosity in an EU-15
member state thus depends on the level of the public benefits and the application of
the 2 + 3 + 2 rule. Both decisions at the national level potentially create policy external-
ities on other member states as migration flows to other destinations and their skill
composition might be diverted as a result. But is there evidence for a race to the bot-
tom after the decision in Copenhagen in 2002? Has the EU enlargement initiated stra-
tegic behavior between the different EU-15 countries?
Figure 1 below shows the development of the ratio of public social expenditures rela-
tive to the GDP level in the EU-15 member states after 2002. The year 2002 is chosen
as a starting point since the decision to enlarge the EU took place in that year. Hence,
potential adjustments of welfare states directly after the final enlargement decision are
considered in the analysis. The measurement is normalized to 1 in each country for the
reference year 2004.
The numbers are based on detailed OECD data for 2002 to 2009 and projections of
the aggregated spending for the years 2010 to 2012. Cash benefits and benefits in kind
are included. Data are collected from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)6.
For the countries in the South (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), an upward trend in
the relative importance of the social expenditures can be observed until 2009. From the
year 2009 onwards, the ratios stay relatively constant despite the abolishment of restric-
tions towards workers from the EU-2 in Greece, Portugal and Spain. The ratios of































































































































Figure 1 Ratio of public social expenditures to GDP in the EU-15 countries, 2002 - 2012.
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to the level of 2004 although the labor market restrictions for workers from the EU-8
were lifted in 2007.
Denmark, Finland and Sweden are characterized by weak declines in the relative
expenditures until 2007. However, in Denmark and Finland, these declines are more
than offset by increases in the measurement from 2007 to 2012. Only in Sweden, the
ratio in 2012 stays below the value of 2004. For Austria and Germany, the develop-
ment shows a stable pattern over time, the levels in 2012 are close to the levels re-
ported in 2004. The numbers for Ireland and the UK indicate a tremendous increase.
In Ireland, the ratio in 2012 is about 40% larger than in 2004. For the UK, an increase
of about 20% is reported. Despite the opening of the borders for the workers from
the EU-8 in 2004, no evidence for a relative decline in public social expenditures can
be found in the two countries. In fact also data on public social expenditures per
capita in purchasing power do not support the race to the bottom hypothesis. In
Additional file 1: Figure 2A, the development of the purchasing power adjusted
expenditures per capita is illustrated. It shows that in all EU-15 countries the expen-
ditures per capita increased during the period from 2004 to 2009.
One might argue that relative or per capita measurements cannot account for in-
creases in the number of recipients, for example, in the case of increasing unemploy-
ment rates. Obviously, numbers on the expenditures per recipient would be the most
accurate measurement of the welfare state generosity. Unfortunately, data that are
internationally comparable are not available. However, the OECD Benefits and Wages
database provides internationally comparable information on the net replacement rate
(NRR). This rate which measures the ratio of the replacement income in the case of
unemployment relative to the average income of the worker before unemployment is
presented in Additional file 1: Figure 1A. The development of the NRR does not indi-
cate evidence for a dramatic decrease in the benefit levels across EU-15 countries. Be-
sides the decision on the design of the welfare state, an EU-15 country had a second
policy instrument for strategic interaction: the 2 + 3 + 2 rule. In Additional file 1: Table
1A, the application of this rule from 2004 to 2011 is presented.
The findings of the descriptive analysis show that there is no clear evidence for a
race to the bottom after the decision on EU accession in 2002. Social expenditures
relative to GDP rather show an increasing trend until 2012 which might be ex-
plained by increasing unemployment rates that outweigh the effects of EU enlarge-
ment. This finding is supported by Gaston and Rajaguru (2013) who report a
positive relationship between the ratio of social expenditures to GDP and the change
in immigration relative to the native population. The development of the net re-
placement rate that determines the out-of-work benefits of an unemployed person
also does not support the hypothesis of an erosion of welfare state protection driven
by EU enlargement.
However, a central question remains unanswered: did the restrictions on the free-
dom of movement eliminate the pressure to reduce welfare levels or was the “welfare
magnet” effect too weak to significantly influence policy making on the national level? This
question is addressed in the following sections which are dedicated to the empirical analysis
of the determinants of migration flows and their interaction with the migration regime
in place.
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4.1 The dataset
With the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), Eurostat provides data from the na-
tional micro census surveys for all 27 EU member states containing information on demo-
graphic characteristics and the job situation of the surveyed. Due to the standardization of
the questionnaire, the data are comparable and can be used for cross country compari-
sons. In spite of the comparability across countries, the EU-LFS dataset and household
survey data in general are still seldom used for the estimation of international migration
flows (Rendall et al., 2003). It is argued that the estimates are often imprecise due to sev-
eral problems regarding the representation of migrants in survey data. Rendall et al.
(2003) come to the conclusion that, on average, the LFS underestimates the size of the mi-
gration flows by around 15 to 25 per cent compared to data from the UK’s port survey,
the International Passenger Survey and the UK censuses.
Martí and Ródenas (2007) confirm these results. In their study, a comparison of offi-
cial register and census statistics with the estimations based on the EU-LFS is con-
ducted. With respect to migrant stock estimates based on the self-reported nationality,
Martí and Ródenas (2007) report that the EU-LFS numbers coincide with the official
statistics from immigration registers or censuses in most EU-15 countries. Only for
Greece and Spain do numbers show significant divergences7. Other examples for stud-
ies on immigration based on information from the LFS are Blanchflower and Shadforth
(2009), Drinkwater et al. (2009) and Dustmann et al. (2010). After the discussion of the
weaknesses of the data, Dustmann et al. (2010) who use the UK LFS emphasize that
“despite these limitations, the LFS remains the best available source of data on immi-
grant stocks […]” (p. 7). Relying on data from the same source, Longhi and Rokicka
(2012) expect the survey to offer a precise picture of the immigrants that live in the UK
including the self-employed.
To my knowledge, there is no analysis of determinants of migration flows across EU
countries based on EU-LFS data. Beine et al. (2011) take cross section data on two years
(1990 and 2000) from the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) database. Changes affecting mi-
gration incentives and flows in the 10-year-period between 1990 and 2000 cannot be con-
sidered. Pedersen et al. (2008) also use data from 1990 and 2000 from statistical offices of
26 OECD countries. Consequently, the same problem as in Beine et al. (2011) applies. De
Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) use micro data from the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP). The authors can thus control for the effects of the socio-economic back-
ground of the immigrants. However, the study suffers from possible imprecision due to
small sample sizes as the samples of the ECHP are considerably smaller than samples of
the micro census. The reasons why I use EU-LFS data are the availability of socio-
economic information and the large number of observations.
4.2 Migrant stocks in EU-15 countries after 2004
In this study, information on self-reported nationality in the EU-LFS dataset is used to
measure the immigrant stock in an EU-15 destination country. This procedure has
two advantages over the alternative country of birth principle: 1) nationality defines an
immigrant’s status in official statistics of most EU member states and 2) the institu-
tional restrictions on the freedom of movement (2 + 3 + 2 rule) which are applied on
the basis of the worker’s nationality can be considered in the empirical analysis.
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scientific use files. For the years 2004 to 2011, the self-reported EU nationalities are
subsumed in three country groups: EU-15, EU-10 and EU-2. Since, before 2004, data
on nationality are even less precise8, the analysis exclusively relies on EU-LFS data
from 2004 to 2011.
Denmark, Finland and Sweden group EU-10 and EU-2 nationalities under the single
category EU-12. As this does not allow for the consideration of differential effects
through the 2 + 3 + 2 rule, these countries are excluded from the analysis. All three
countries are characterized by high levels of welfare state protection relative to the
other EU-15 countries so that excluding them might bias the estimation of the “welfare
magnet” effect. However, the number of EU migrants that moved to these three desti-
nations after 2004 is relatively small (Holland et al., 2011). Hence, the regression coeffi-
cients of the “welfare magnet” effect should overestimate the true impact of the public
benefits when these countries are excluded. They should thus represent an upper
bound of the effect in reality.
In Additional file 1: Figure 3A, the development of the EU-10 migrant stocks in the
EU-15 countries is presented. It shows that the increases were modest in most coun-
tries. Nonetheless, some countries experienced larger inflows than expected before
accession. In Germany and the UK, the number of EU-10 nationals increased signifi-
cantly from 2004 to 2011. Ireland also experienced large inflows. The stock of migrants
from the EU-10 countries expanded from about 59,000 persons in 2005 to about
180,000 in 2011. In the other EU-15 countries, the increases are less pronounced in ab-
solute terms.
Additional file 1: Figure 4A illustrates that migration from the EU-2 to the EU-15
countries followed a different pattern. The flows were concentrated on Italy and Spain.
In Italy, the number of EU-2 nationals increased from about 350,000 persons in 2005
to over 1,000,000 persons in 2011. Spain experienced an increase from around 300,000
(2004) to around 870,000 persons (2011). EU-LFS data for the other countries report a
much smaller increase in the size of the stocks.
5 Empirical analysis
The aim of the following empirical analysis is to quantify (1) the effect of different
levels of welfare state protection and (2) the effect of the 2 + 3 + 2 rule on the annual
migration flows into an EU-15 destination country. Besides these two policy instru-
ments of decision makers in the destination countries, I control for a rich variety of
other economic and non-economic determinants (“endogenous controls”)9.
5.1 Constructing age-specific diaspora ratios
As dependent variable for the regression analysis, I define ratios of the total number of
migrants in an EU-15 country relative to the number of persons in the source country
group (EU-15, EU-10 and EU-2)10. In the following, I will refer to these ratios as dias-
pora ratios since they represent the proportion of nationals that live in the diaspora
relative to the persons that did not leave the source country. The micro structure of
the dataset allows for a further distinction of these ratios with respect to the age of the
migrants. I therefore construct three age groups: the 15-24 year old, the 25-34 year old
and the 35-44 year old persons.
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grants estimated with the EU-LFS dataset. The annual changes of the migrant stocks
characterized by an age larger than 44 years are extremely small in the considered EU-
15 countries. This proves the irrelevance of the migrant flows in these age groups for
the empirical analysis. The observation that geographic mobility decreases with the
aging of an individual can be explained with the human capital theory. Arguably, gains
from migration are largest for young migrants as this group profits the most from a
higher remuneration of human capital over the life time. Thus, at a certain age, a move
abroad is not advantageous anymore as the fixed costs of migration exceed the ex-
pected gains from a larger compensation of the human capital in an alternative
location.
Unfortunately, I cannot identify whether a 15-24 year old individual is a student. In
this case, the restrictions of the freedom of movement for workers do not apply. Hence,
the regression results might be slightly biased. However, since many students also con-
sider staying in the destination country for work reasons after finishing their studies
the 2 + 3 + 2 rule also has relevance for this group of migrants. The potential bias of
not considering student status should thus not be overestimated in its significance.
The advantage of including migrants from other EU-15 countries is that it increases
the number of country panel observations for the final analysis and, hence, its accuracy.
There is no reason to expect that the behavior of EU-15 migrants systematically differs
from the behavior of migrants from the countries that joined the EU after 2004. The
fact that EU-15 migrants are not affected by any restrictions of the freedom of move-
ment between 2004 and 2011 is considered by the inclusion of a migration regime
dummy variable. In the case of EU-15 migrants, this dummy takes the value of 0 to in-
dicate unrestricted freedom of movement within the whole EU.
As I consider three source country groups (EU-15, EU-10, EU-2) and three age groups,
nine cohorts are built per year and destination country. Using weights provided by Euro-
stat, I then calculate the size of these nine diaspora cohorts and the size of the respective
nine source cohorts. Finally, I build the diaspora ratios as the proportion of the size of the
diaspora cohort to the size of the source cohort. Theoretically, for each destination coun-
try, 72 ratios could be constructed for the eight years from 2004 to 2011. In fact, the num-
ber of ratios considered in the analysis is smaller than 72 per destination since some
countries do not deliver LFS data for each of the years under observation11.
5.2. Identification strategy
Two approaches for estimating the determinants of migration flows dominate the literature:
the dynamic stock model and the static flow model12. I estimate parameters for both model
approaches. However, in the case of the dynamic stock model, the estimations indicate a dy-
namically instable model so that I reject the validity of the approach13. Hence, only the re-
sults of the static flow model are presented and interpreted in the following sections. The
model is based on the assumption that migrants choose the destination country that maxi-
mizes their utility. This utility and thus the migration decision is determined by many dif-
ferent factors, be they destination country-, source country- or individual-specific. In the
following, j denotes the 12 EU-15 destination countries (j = 1,…,12), i the source cohort
(i = 1,…,9) and t the time period (t = 1,…,8, from 2004 to 2011). The identification strategy
is given by equation (1) which is estimated by using pooled OLS:
Skupnik IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:15 Page 10 of 21
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/15Δmij;t ¼ α0 þ β1Dj;t‐1 þ β2Nij; t‐1 þ β3Si;t‐1 þ β4Iij;t‐1 þ β5Tt þ β6ci þ εij;t ð1Þ
Like in Pedersen et al. (2008), the dependent variable Δmij,t denotes the annual
change in the diaspora ratio. It describes a net change since the remigration decision is
considered. Applying this definition has an advantage over the analysis of gross changes.
It accounts for the fact that, for example, a change of the net wage in a destination coun-
try does not only affect the gross inflow of migrants, but at the same time has an effect on
the remigration from the diaspora. Without death and naturalization, the change in the
diaspora ratio measures the annual net emigration of the selected group from the source.
A challenge of analyzing determinants of migration flows is defining a strategy that is
robust to possible estimation biases through reverse causality. An increase in the nom-
inal net wage level might deliver a good explanation for an increase in the migrant
stock as the destination country becomes more attractive due to the improved employ-
ment conditions. However, there might be an alternative, reverse explanation: migrants
bring capital into the destination country and thereby increase the nation-wide capital
to labor ratio. The increase in the compensation of human capital might thus be the re-
sult of the immigrant inflow rather than the cause of it. In order to address these pos-
sible endogeneity issues through reverse causality, I regress the current change rate in
the diaspora ratio on explanatory variables that are lagged by one period. This proced-
ure does not guarantee strict exogeneity, but it assures predeterminancy of the regres-
sors (Mayda, 2010).
Dj,t-1 is a vector that consists of the destination country-specific factors influencing
the migration and remigration decision. It contains the annual nominal net wage in
10,000 Euro, the unemployment rate in % and the size of the population in million per-
sons in the destination. In addition, a Southern European country dummy which takes
the value 1 if the destination country is located in Southern Europe14 and a migration
regime dummy which takes the value 1 if the freedom of movement for workers is re-
stricted according to the 2 + 3 + 2 rule are included. Last but not least, the ratio of the
public social expenditures to the GDP level in the destination countries is added as a
measurement for the generosity of the welfare state. Nij,t-1 consists of the source-
destination-specific network effects. It does not only account for the size of the dias-
pora (number of persons in million) in the destination, but also for its composition as
it includes the average education level, the proportion of females and the employment
rate in the diaspora cohort as regressors. Si,t-1 represents a vector describing the socio-
economic characteristics of the source population. It includes two variables, the average
education level and the proportion of employed persons in the source cohort15.
The education level is measured based on the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED). In order to facilitate the comparison and in line with the literature16,
the educational achievements are categorized in three groups (low, medium and high)
taking the values 1, 2 and 3. The low education group comprises of the ISCED levels 0 to
2 (early childhood education to lower secondary education). The medium level covers the
ISCED levels 3 to 4 (upper secondary education to short-cycle tertiary education) while
the high education level subsumes the ISCED levels 5 and 6 (bachelor or equivalent to
doctoral or equivalent). These education variables are constructed as simple averages over
the three categories taking the values 1, 2 or 3. With respect to the source countries, the
education level is calculated over all individuals living in the EU-10 countries or EU-2
Skupnik IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:15 Page 11 of 21
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/15countries. For example, the education variable for the 15-24 year old EU-2 source cohort
denotes the average education level of the 15-24 year old Bulgarians and Romanians to-
gether. The same logic applies to the calculation of the proportion of employed persons in
the source.
Finally, Iij,t-1 contains interaction effects of all push and pull factors (Dj,t-1, Nij,t-1, Si,t-1)
with the migration regime dummy (2 + 3 + 2 rule) for the destination country. By
including this vector, the differential effects of the migration determinants under the tem-
porary restriction of the freedom of movement are controlled for. ci is a source cohort
fixed effect. It controls for unobserved heterogeneity of the age groups in the different
groups of source countries. Further, in all regressions, time dummies for each period are
included, which are represented by the vector Tt.
In contrast to, for example, Pedersen et al. (2008), I do not include destination (cj) or
destination-source pair (cij) fixed effects. The destination country fixed effects would “eat
up” the effect of the observed destination country-specific pull factors that do not show
considerable variation over time (for example, the country’s ratio of social expenditures to
GDP). The error term εij,t is assumed to be normally distributed and clustered over time
periods and destination countries. The clustering problem is addressed by the estimation
of cluster robust standard errors. I apply the STATA routine provided by Cameron et al.
(2011) that accounts for non-nested two-way clustering in error terms17.
5.3. Regression results
Table 1 below shows the results of the pooled OLS regression analysis. I exclusively
apply pooled OLS as estimation strategy and do not use traditional panel estimators
like Random Effects (RE) or Fixed Effects (FE) estimators. In result, destination country
or country pair fixed effects are not considered and, hence, unobserved heterogeneity
across cohorts is not corrected for. This is explained by the fact that the most import-
ant variables of the analysis do not show strong variance over the time dimension. Ap-
plying panel estimators would eliminate the effect of the relatively constant variables
over time. This phenomenon is explained in detail by Pedersen et al. (2008).
The number of cell entries in the country panel is reduced as some diaspora ratios are
constructed based on less than 50 individual observations in the EU-LFS sample. These
estimates are presumably biased and thus are excluded. After dropping the data points,
on average, each diaspora cohort is constructed based on 466 individual observations in
the EU-LFS sample. The number of constructed cohort observations is 43218. In the
Additional file 1, I also present the regression results with diaspora ratios that are con-
structed based on at least 10 individual observations. Since the results of both estimations
do not significantly differ, I expect the bias from the exclusion of ratios to be negligible.
In the first four specifications (1) - (4), I model the effect of the 2 + 3 + 2 rule in a
very simple manner by the inclusion of a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
freedom of movement is restricted and the value 0 if not. In specification (5), the model
structure becomes more sophisticated as, in addition, interaction effects of the migra-
tion regime dummy with the other push and pull factors are added. In the following
interpretation, I first explain the results of specification (1) to (4) and then focus separ-
ately on the fifth specification.
As expected, the annual nominal net wage in 10,000 Euro positively affects the an-
nual migration inflows to a destination. In specification (1) to (4), the coefficient is
Table 1 Static flow model estimates for 12 EU-15 destination countries and 9 source
cohorts
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Δmij,t = annual change in the diaspora ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Destination country variables Dj,t-1
Annual nominal net wage





































































Source-destination (network) effects Nij,t-1



















































Interaction of push-pull factors and the migration regime Iij,t-1
a












Diaspora stock in j in mio.
persons × regime dummy
-1.996
(4.239)
Proportion of employed in
source × regime dummy
-5.890
(16.186)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age and source dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
Source cohort dummies No No No Yes Yes
Constant included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.286 0.298 0.315 0.338 0.474
Number of observations 432 432 432 432 432
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors that are clustered by destination country and time periods are shown
in parentheses. I use the STATA routine by Cameron et al. (2011) to control for two-way clustered error terms. In all
regressions, time dummies and a constant are included. aFurther variables are included: see the Additional file 1 for a
table with all covariates. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year except for the migration regime dummy.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/15significant at the 1% level and ranges between values of 1.792 and 2.143. The effect of
the unemployment rate in % is less clear cut since the estimated coefficients are all in-
significant at the 10% level. However, the negative signs are line with economic theory.
Larger unemployment rates should imply smaller numbers of immigrant inflows. With
respect to the employment opportunities, migrants seem to put more weight on the ex-
pected compensation of labor than on the unemployment likelihood approximated by
the unemployment rate.
The size of the destination country measured by the population in million persons
seems to have a positive effect on immigration. The value of the coefficients ranges
from 0.003 to 0.017. However, the effect is only significant at the 5% level in specifica-
tion (1). I further control for the attractiveness of a destination country in terms of the
geographic position by including a dummy for the Southern European countries. The
dummy takes the value 1 if the destination country is Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain
and 0 otherwise. Although this classification is arguably arbitrary, the significance of
the estimated effects in all specifications at the 1% level gives strong support for the
idea that destination countries in the South are endowed with unobserved factors that
attract migrants. These might be non-economic factors like a mild climate or a high
quality of life (Graves, 1980).
In specification (1) to (4), the restrictions of the freedom of movement are modeled
with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a restriction is in place and 0 if not19.
Surprisingly, the coefficients of the migration regime dummy show a positive sign in
the first four specifications, but the standard errors indicate that the coefficients are
not significantly different from 0. According to economic theory, the dummy should
enter the equation with a negative sign as the introduction of a restriction on the free
movement for workers increases migration costs and should, consequently, result in a
decrease of the migration inflow. The regression results though give an indication for
the need of a more sophisticated modeling of the restricted freedom of movement as
suggested by Razin and Wahba (2011).
A potential “welfare magnet” effect is modeled by the inclusion of the ratio of public so-
cial expenditures to GDP as a covariate. While in (1) and (2), the level of social expendi-
tures relative to the GDP does not have a statistically significant effect on the diaspora
ratio, the coefficients in (3) and (4) have a positive sign and are significant at the 1% and
5% level, respectively. These results give an indication that the generosity of the welfare
state measured by the ratio of public social expenditures to the GDP might represent a
pull factor for potential migrants. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that the pull effect
of the benefits cannot be identified if the socio-economic characteristics in the diaspora
cohorts are not controlled for. After including these additional controls, the “welfare mag-
net” can be disentangled from the pull effects of the diaspora characteristics.
The vector Dj,t-1 that represents the destination specific pull factors is included in all
regressions. In specification (1), the annual change in the diaspora ratio is exclusively
regressed on these destination specific variables. Specification (2) differs from (1) as the
size of the diaspora from the same group of source countries in million persons is
added as a regressor. The inclusion weakly increases the explanatory power of the
model to an R-squared value of 0.298. The coefficients of the diaspora stock effect are
positive in (2) to (4), but the reported standard errors indicate insignificance of the ef-
fects. In contrast to the findings of Beine et al. (2011) and Pedersen et al. (2008) who
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tries, I do not find empirical support for the network effect in the EU-15.
In specification (3), the regression is enriched by the inclusion of further variables
measuring the source-destination network effect. The average education level, the pro-
portion of employed and the proportion of females in the diaspora cohorts are added.
However, only the proportion of females has a negative, significant effect on the annual
change of the diaspora ratio. This observation might be explained by migration patterns
that reflect a traditional division in gender roles within families. If men tend to migrate
before their wives due to job-related incentives, for instance, a small share of females in
the diaspora corresponds to a large potential of female partners in the source. On the
way to the “new equilibrium” which is characterized by female migration due to family
reunification, the potential for further migration deteriorates. This phenomenon finds
its expression in a decreasing effect of the proportion of females in the diaspora on the
annual change rate in the diaspora ratio.
Furthermore, two source-specific factors are considered: the average education level
and the proportion of employed in the source cohort. While no evidence is found that
the average education level in the source has an impact on the dependent variable, the
proportion of employed in the source cohort seems to negatively affect the annual
change in the diaspora ratio. For specification (4), a significant negative effect with a
coefficient value of -19.142 is reported. This is in line with the economic intuition. An
increase in the employment rate of a source country has a positive effect on the em-
ployment opportunities of the workers. Hence, the incentive to emigrate for job reasons
diminishes if the employment rate expands.
Finally, in specification (5), vector Iij,t-1 is considered for the first time. This vector ac-
counts for the recent findings by Razin and Wahba (2011). It contains interaction ef-
fects of the migration regime dummy with all push and pull factors. The explanatory
power of the model increases to an R-squared value of 0.474 indicating a significant im-
provement of the identification strategy. The coefficient of the annual nominal net
wage effect in the destination country has a value of 4.508 which is 2 to 3 times the size
of the coefficients in (1) to (4). For the interaction effect of the wage variable with the
2 + 3 + 2 rule dummy, a coefficient of -3.479 is reported. The application of the rule re-
duces the wage effect from 4.508 to 1.029 which leads to the conclusion that the re-
striction of the freedom of movement is binding with respect to the net wage as a pull
factor. In addition, the direct effect of the migration regime dummy variable becomes
negative even though the estimator is insignificant. It has a coefficient value of -10.436
which has a reducing effect on the constant.
The coefficient of the social expenditure variable decreases to a value of 5.897 and
is not significant. This result stands in contrast to the findings of Razin and Wahba
(2011) who argue that the “welfare magnet” effect should increase in size and signifi-
cance when the differential effect of the migration regime is controlled for. The com-
parison of specification (3) and (4) in which the migration regime is controlled for
solely by the inclusion of a dummy variable delivers interest insights. In these cases,
the benefits seem to act as a pull factor. However, by modeling the effects of the re-
stricted freedom of movement more realistically with interaction effects, the signifi-
cance of the welfare state as pull factor disappears while the coefficient of the
unemployment rate in the destination becomes significant. The integration of the
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incentives.
For the interaction effect of the “welfare magnet” variable with the 2 + 3 + 2 rule
dummy, a coefficient value of -5.147 is found. A potential pull effect of the welfare state
variable would be almost completely offset by the application of the 2 + 3 + 2 rule. Since I
find rather mixed evidence with respect to the “welfare magnet” effect, the next section is
devoted to a sensitivity analysis with alternative measurements for the welfare state.
5.4. Alternative modeling of the welfare state
There are other measurements for the welfare state generosity that are applied in the
literature. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009), for instance, calculate the net replacement
income in purchasing power to model the “welfare magnet” effect. In the following sec-
tion, I thus perform estimations with alternative measurements of the generosity of
welfare states as robustness checks. In Table 2 below, I modify specification (5) shown
in Table 1. The ratio of social expenditures to GDP is replaced by the net replacement
rate in (6) and by the nominal replacement income in (7). The net replacement rate is
calculated as the ratio of annual net earnings and out-of-work income for a single per-
son without children (100% average wage) in each destination country while the nom-
inal replacement income measured in 10,000 Euro is the annual out-of-work income
for a single person without children earning 100% of the average wage. Housing bene-
fits are included. Both measurements are provided by the OECD Statistics Out of Work
Tax/Benefit.
In specification (7), the net wage effect is also relatively similar in size compared to
the other setups. However, the estimator for the coefficient is only significant at the
10% level. The coefficient for the net replacement income has a value of 1.546, but is
insignificant according to the calculated standard errors. One explanation for the low
significance levels of both, the net wage and the net replacement income effect, might
be a multi-collinearity phenomenon since the replacement income is per construction
highly correlated with the nominal net wage.
5.5 Comparison of effects
The magnitude of the effects is difficult to evaluate since the dimensions of the ex-
planatory variables differ. So how can we interpret the coefficients in order to draw
conclusions about their relevance? In Table 3 below, I compare a selection of economic
effects that seem to have a major impact on the migration flows in the EU-15. The ef-
fects are made comparable by presenting the change of the dependent variable after a
change in the explanatory variable by 1 standard deviation of the mean. In the second
column, the standardized measurement for a change in the explanatory variable is in-
troduced. In column 3, the coefficients of the direct effect and of the interaction effect
with the migration regime dummy are shown. Column 4 presents the change of the
dependent variable for the free movement scenario after a standardized increase in the
explanatory variable. Equivalently, in column 5, the changes of the dependent variable
for the restricted movement scenario are summarized.
In specification (5), a standardized increase in a destination country’s annual net wage
(6,140 Euro) increases the annual change in the diaspora ratio by 2.76820. This trans-
lates into about 2.8 additional persons out of 1000 persons in the source migrating to
Table 2 Static flow model estimates with alternative measurements for the welfare state
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Δmij,t = annual change in
the diaspora ratio
(6) (7)
Destination country variables Xj,t-1
Annual nominal net wage in 10,000 Euro in j 5.108*** 4.391*
(1.610) (2.467)
Unemployment rate in % in j -0.401*** -0.420***
(0.098) (0.115)
Population in destination country j in mio. persons 0.038* 0.039**
(0.020) (0.019)
Southern European country (0/1) 9.272*** 9.305***
(1.722) (1.704)
Regime dummy (restricted freedom of m.) in j (0/1) -11.059 -9.450
(7.794) (8.401)
Net replacement rate in % in j 2.770
(4.860)
Annual replacement income in 10,000 Euro in j 1.546
(2.971)
Source-destination (network) effects Nij,t-1
Diaspora stock in j in mio. persons 0.508 0.710
(2.842) (2.844)
Education level (ISCED) in the age-specific diaspora 2.964 3.043
(1.845) (1.950)
Proportion of females in the age-specific diaspora -1.532 -1.592
(3.130) (3.241)
Proportion of employed in the age-specific diaspora -3.480 -3.716
(4.150) (4.055)
Source specific factors Si,t-1
Education level (ISCED) in the source cohort -3.515 -3.584
(4.237) (4.327)
Proportion of employed in the source cohort -18.296** -18.679**
(8.632) (8.133)
Interaction of push-pull factors and the migration regime Iij,t-1
a
Annual nominal net wage x regime dummy -4.129** -3.200
(1.606) (2.531)
Unemployment rate x regime dummy 0.505*** 0.537***
(0.145) (0.149)
Diaspora stock in j in mio. persons x regime dummy -1.393 -1.595
(3.860) (3.891)
Net replacement rate x regime dummy -2.668
(4.487)
Annual replacement income x regime dummy -1.925
(2.852)
Proportion of unemployed in the source cohort x -4.262 -3.813
regime dummy (16.629) (16.311)
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Table 2 Static flow model estimates with alternative measurements for the welfare state
(Continued)
Source cohort dummies Yes Yes
R-squared 0.475 0.475
Number of observations 432 432
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors that are clustered by destination country and time periods are shown in
parentheses. I use the STATA routine provided by Cameron et al. (2011) to control for two-way clustered error terms. In
all regressions, time dummies and a constant are included. aFurther variables are included: see Additional file 1 for a table
with all covariates. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year except for the migration regime dummy.
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dom of movement is restricted21. Applying a restrictive migration regime thus has a
differential effect of about 2.1 persons per 1000 persons in the source on the annual
change in the diaspora ratio22. The effects of the unemployment rate in a destination
country are less strong.
In specification (6) and (7), for the free movement scenario, a decrease in the
dependent variable of about 1.2 is reported after an increase in the unemployment rate
by 2.996 percentage points. In the restricted freedom of movement scenario, a slightly
positive effect is found which is not extremely different from the expected maximum
value of 0 (column 5). If the proportion of employed in a source cohort increases by
5.6 percentage points, the annual change in the diaspora ratio decreases by about 1 in
the free movement scenario. The effects in the case of the restricted migration regime
are insignificant. This might be an indicator that the push effects are not affected by
the application of restrictions in a single destination while the pull effects are more or
less exactly offset by the application of the 2 + 3 + 2 rule.Table 3 Comparison of the economic effects on migration flows in the EU-15
Explanatory variable Δ of 1 standard
dev. from mean













Annual nominal net wage in
10,000 Euro in destination
0.614 (6140 Euro) (4) 2.143***/none (4) 1.316 - -
(5) 4.508**/-3.479* (5) 2.768 (5) 0.632 (5) 2.136
(6) 5.108***/-4.129** (6) 3.136 (6) 0.601 (6) 2.537





(4) -0.082/none (4) -0.246 - -
(5) -0.329***/0.438** (5) -0.986 (5) 0.327 (5) -1.313
(6) -0.401***/0.505*** (6) -1.201 (6) 0.312 (6) -1.513
(7) -0.420***/0.537*** (7) -1.258 (7) 0.351 (7) -1.609




(4) -19.142*/none (4) -1.072 - -
(5) -17.305**/-5.890 (5) -0.969 (5) -1.299 (5) 0.330
(6) -18.296**/-4.262 (6) -1.025 (6) -1.263 (6) 0.238
(7) -18.679**/-3.813 (7) -1.046 (7) -1.260 (7) 0.214
Social expenditures/GDP
in the destination country
0.033
(3.3%-points)
(4) 12.829***/none (4) 0.423 - -
(5) 5.897/-5.147 (5) 0.195 (5) 0.025 (5) 0.170
Net replacement rate in %
in the destination country
0.181
(18.1%-points)
(6) 2.770/-2.668 (6) 0.501 (6) -0.018 (6) 0.519
Annual replacement income
in 10,000 Euro in destination
0.580 (5800 Euro) (7) 1.546/-1.925 (7) 0.897 (7) -0.220 (7) 1.117
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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level by 3.3 percentage points results in an increase in the dependent variable of 0.423.
This much larger effect than in (5) is significant at the 1% level. However, with respect
to the magnitude, it is still of minor importance. The effect of both the nominal net
wage in a destination and the proportion of employed in the source cohort, is twice to
three times as large as the “welfare magnet” effect. For specification (5), a hypothetical
change in the dependent variable of 0.195 is reported for the free movement scenario
and almost no effect for the restricted movement regime (column 5). Though, the esti-
mated coefficients are statistically insignificant.
As result of the comparison, the following findings should be emphasized. First, the
net wage in a destination country exerts a much larger positive effect on the migrant
inflows than the public social expenditures. The coefficients in specification (5) indicate
an effect of the net wage which is about 14 times as large as the effect of the welfare
state variable. In addition, the standard error of the welfare state coefficient points to a
statistical insignificance of the effect. Under the assumption that the findings in specifi-
cation (4) most accurately describe the reality, the effect of the net wage is still three
times as large as the effect of the social expenditure variable. In the case of the net re-
placement rate and the annual replacement income, the gap lies between those two ex-
tremes23. Secondly, restricting the freedom of movement almost completely offsets the
migration incentives of the pull factors, but does not seem to counterbalance the effects
from changing push factor variables in the source countries.
6 Conclusion
The EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 initiated a debate about the future of the
welfare states in the EU-15. According to Kvist (2004) and Sinn (2002), the logic of
“welfare magnetism” might cause strategic behavior of national governments with re-
spect to the generosity of the welfare state. Hence, policy makers were expected to
reduce the level of social security to avoid their countries becoming attractive desti-
nations for “welfare migrants”. In addition, national governments were endowed with
another strategic instrument for reducing the potential pressure from these migra-
tion incentives: the 2 + 3 + 2 rule which allows the closing of borders for migrants
from the new member states by temporarily restricting the freedom of movement for
workers.
In this paper, the interaction of these two policy variables in the EU-15 after 2002 is
analyzed. The first result is that the race to the bottom after the accession decision did
not happen as predicted. OECD data on the development of the social expenditures
relative to GDP and the net replacement rates in the destination countries after 2002
give no indication of a strong EU-15 wide reduction in spending on welfare. Secondly,
in the analysis of determinants of migration flows to EU-15 countries from 2004 to
2011, evidence is found that the “welfare magnet” effect is rather weak or does not persist
at all and presumably does not influence national decision making. The ratio of social ex-
penditures to GDP as a measurement for the welfare state generosity does not seem to
have a positive effect on the immigration flows to EU-15 countries. The expected pay-
ments in the case of unemployment measured by the net replacement rate and the net re-
placement income do also not act as “welfare magnets”. In contrast, the application of the
2 + 3 + 2 rule is found to have a strong impact on migration behavior. It completely
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rate in a destination country.
Thus, two reasons can be identified which explain the observation that the race
to the bottom did not take place after 2002. First, the “welfare magnet” effect is just
one determinant among a large number of other determinants of migration deci-
sions and is probably of too little relevance to justify major welfare state reforms in
the EU-15. Secondly, the application of restrictions on the freedom of movement
for workers might have neutralized potential effects of the welfare state. Further-
more, evidence is found that the positive migration incentives from a larger remu-
neration of human capital are also offset in the case of restricted freedom of
movement for workers.
Based on the results of this analysis, it thus seems unlikely that the end of the 2 +
3 + 2 period for Bulgaria and Romania in January 2014 will initiate major reforms of
national welfare state institutions in the EU-15 or even start a race to the bottom of
welfare state standards. This prediction is supported by the experience in countries
that already opened the labor market for workers from the EU-2. In Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Sweden, no evidence for adjustments of
the welfare state can be found after the realization of the freedom of movement for
EU-2 workers.
Endnotes
1EU-10: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia.
2EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
3EU-8: EU-10 without Cyprus and Malta.
4See Mayda (2010) and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) for an overview.
5See Nannestad (2007) for a detailed discussion.
6Giulietti and Wahba (2012) describe the composition of social expenditures in
OECD countries based on the SOCX database.
7For the year 2001, the estimations for the non-national population stock in Greece
based on the EU-LFS is 45.38 percent of the number that is reported by the Greek cen-
sus data. For Spain, the estimation from the EU-LFS is about 43.62 percent of the num-
ber reported by the Spanish population register in 2001.
8In the surveys before 2004, it is distinguished between EU-15 and non-EU-15
nationalities.
9For an overview of the factors, see Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008).
10This is a standard approach in the literature. See, for example, Pedersen et al. (2008).
11See the Additional file 1.
12See Baas and Brücker (2010) for a discussion of the alternative approaches.
13See the Additional file 1.
14For a discussion of the climate as a pull factor, see Graves (1980).
15A detailed description of the variables included and their data sources can be found
in the Additional file 1.
16See Pedersen et al. (2008) or Beine et al. (2011).
17See also Thompson (2011).
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ard deviation is 700.22. The smallest number of observations per cohort is 51, the lar-
gest is 5884.
19Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish between the source countries Cyprus and Malta
that were not affected by the restrictions and the Eastern European member states
(EU-8). However, since the population in Cyprus and Malta is relatively small, it is ar-
guable that the effects of the transitional periods on the immigration flows from these
countries can be neglected.
206,140/10,000 × 4.508 = 2.768 (see column 4).
216,140/10,000 × (4.508 – 3.479) = 0.632 (see column 5).
22See column 6 which presents the difference in the values of column 4 and column 5.
23I find that the effect of the net wage is about six times as large as the non-
significant net replacement rate effect and three times as large as the non-significant
replacement income effect. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) report a net wage effect that
is about 10 times as large as the “welfare magnet” effect of the replacement income. In
contrast to my results, they find significant effects of this welfare measurement.
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Additional file 1: Alternative measurements of the generosity of the welfare states. Development of the
average net replacement rates in the EU-15, 2002 - 2010 Figure 1A. Development of the public social
expenditures per capita with constant prices (2000) and in PPP (2000) relative to the year 2004, 2004 – 2009
Figure 2A. Application of the 2+3+2 rule (year when the restriction was lifted) Table 1A. Number of migrants with
an EU-10 nationality in the EU-15 countries (2004 - 2011) Figure 3A. Number of migrants with an EU-2 nationality
in the EU-15 countries (2004 - 2011) Figure 4A. Number of migrants with an EU-15 nationality in the EU-15
countries (2004 - 2011) Figure 5A. Migrant stocks in the destination countries, grouped by age and source region
(2010) Table 2A. Population in source regions, grouped by age and source region (2010, in millions) Table 3A.
Number of non-nationals in EU-15 destination countries per 100 persons in the source Table 4A. Summary
statistics of the country panel (minimum of 50 observations per cohort) Table 5A. Summary statistics of the
country panel (minimum of 10 observations per cohort) Table 6A. Pooled OLS regression for the dynamic stock
model (minimum of 50 obs. per cohort) Table 7A. Estimates for the static flow model with all covariates (min. of
50 obs. per cohort) Table 8A. Estimates for the static flow model with all covariates (min. of 10 obs. per cohort)
Table 9A.
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